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Abstract. This paper introduces the XTR public key system. XTR is
based on a new method to represent elements of a subgroup of a mul-
tiplicative group of a finite field. Application of XTR in cryptographic
protocols leads to substantial savings both in communication and com-
putational overhead without compromising security.
1 Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol was the first published prac-
tical solution to the key distribution problem, allowing two parties that have
never met to establish a shared secret key by exchanging information over an
open channel. In the basic DH scheme the two parties agree upon a generator
g of the multiplicative group GF(p)∗ of a prime field GF(p) and they each send
a random power of g to the other party. Assuming both parties know p and g,
each party transmits about log2(p) bits to the other party.
In [7] it was suggested that finite extension fields can be used instead of prime
fields, but no direct computational or communication advantages were implied.
In [22] a variant of the basic DH scheme was introduced where g generates a
relatively small subgroup of GF(p)∗ of prime order q. This considerably reduces
the computational cost of the DH scheme, but has no effect on the number of
bits to be exchanged. In [3] it was shown for the first time how the use of finite
extension fields and subgroups can be combined in such a way that the number of
bits to be exchanged is reduced by a factor 3. More specifically, it was shown that
elements of an order q subgroup of GF(p6)∗ can be represented using 2 log2(p)
bits if q divides p2 − p + 1. Despite its communication efficiency, the method
of [3] is rather cumbersome and computationally not particularly efficient.
In this paper we present a greatly improved version of the method from [3]
that achieves the same communication advantage at a much lower computational
cost. We refer to our new method as XTR, for Efficient and Compact Subgroup
Trace Representation. XTR can be used in conjunction with any cryptographic
protocol that is based on the use of subgroups and leads to substantial savings in
communication and computational overhead. Furthermore, XTR key generation
is very simple. We prove that using XTR in cryptographic protocols does not
affect their security. The best attacks we are aware of are Pollard’s rho method
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Sieve in the full multiplicative group GF(p6)∗. With primes p and q of about
1024/6 ≈ 170 bits the security of XTR is equivalent to traditional subgroup sys-
tems using 170-bit subgroups and 1024-bit finite fields. But with XTR subgroup
elements can be represented using only about 2 ∗ 170 bits, which is substantially
less than the 1024-bits required for their traditional representation.
Full exponentiation in XTR is faster than full scalar multiplication in an
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) over a 170-bit prime field, and thus sub-
stantially faster than full exponentiation in either RSA or traditional subgroup
discrete logarithm systems of equivalent security. XTR keys are much smaller
than RSA keys of comparable security. ECC keys allow a smaller representation
than XTR keys, but in many circumstances (e.g. storage) ECC and XTR key
sizes are comparable. However, XTR is not affected by the uncertainty still mar-
ring ECC. Key selection for XTR is very fast compared to RSA, and orders of
magnitude easier and faster than for ECC. As a result XTR may be regarded as
the best of two worlds, RSA and ECC. It is an excellent alternative to either RSA
or ECC in applications such as SSL/TLS (Secure Sockets Layer, Transport Layer
Security), public key smartcards, WAP/WTLS (Wireless Application Protocol,
Wireless Transport Layer Security), IPSEC/IKE (Internet Protocol Security,
Internet Key Exchange), and SET (Secure Electronic Transaction).
In [14] it is argued that ECC is the only public key system that is suitable
for a variety of environments, including low-end smart cards and over-burdened
web servers communicating with powerful PC clients. XTR shares this advan-
tage with ECC, with the distinct additional advantage that XTR key selection
is very easy. This makes it easily feasible for all users of XTR to have public keys
that are not shared with others, unlike ECC where a large part of the public
key is often shared between all users of the system. Also, compared to ECC,
the mathematics underlying XTR is straightforward, thus avoiding two common
ECC-pitfalls: ascertaining that unfortunate parameter choices are avoided that
happen to render the system less secure, and keeping abreast of, and incorporat-
ing additional checks published in, newly obtained results. The latest example of
the latter is [8], where yet another condition affecting the security of ECC over
finite fields of characteristic two is described. As a consequence the draft IKE
protocol (part of IPSec) for ECC was revised. Note that Odlyzko in [16] advises
to use ECC key sizes of at least 300 bits, even for moderate security needs.
XTR is the first method we are aware of that uses GF(p2) arithmetic to
achieve GF(p6) security, without requiring explicit construction of GF(p6). Let
g be an element of order q > 6 dividing p2−p+1. Because p2−p+1 divides the
order p6−1 of GF(p6)∗ this g generates an order q subgroup of GF(p6)∗. Since q
does not divide any ps − 1 for s = 1, 2, 3 (cf. [11]), the subgroup generated by g
cannot be embedded in the multiplicative group of any true subfield of GF(p6).
We show, however, that arbitrary powers of g can be represented using a single
element of the subfield GF(p2), and that such powers can be computed efficiently
using arithmetic operations in GF(p2) while avoiding arithmetic in GF(p6).
3In Section 2 we describe XTR, and in Section 3 we explain how the XTR
parameters can be found quickly. Applications and comparisons to RSA and
ECC are given in Section 4. In Section 5 we prove that using XTR does not have
a negative impact on the security. Extensions are discussed in Section 6.
2 Subgroup representation and arithmetic
2.1 Preliminaries
Let p ≡ 2 mod 3 be a prime such that the sixth cyclotomic polynomial evaluated
in p, i.e., φ6(p) = p
2 − p+ 1, has a prime factor q > 6. In subsection 3.1 we give
a fast method to select p and q. By g we denote an element of GF(p6)∗ of order
q. Because of the choice of q, this g is not contained in any proper subfield of
GF(p6) (cf. [11]). Many cryptographic applications (cf. Section 4) make use of the
subgroup 〈g〉 generated by g. In this section we show that actual representation
of the elements of 〈g〉 and of any other element of GF(p6) can be avoided. Thus,
there is no need to represent elements of GF(p6), for instance by constructing a
sixth or third degree irreducible polynomial over GF(p) or GF(p2), respectively.
A representation of GF(p2) is needed, however. This is done as follows.
From p ≡ 2 mod 3 it follows that p mod 3 generates GF(3)∗, so that the
zeros α and αp of the polynomial (X3 − 1)/(X − 1) = X2 + X + 1 form an
optimal normal basis for GF(p2) over GF(p). Because αi = αi mod 3, an element
x ∈ GF(p2) can be represented as x1α+x2αp = x1α+x2α2 for x1, x2 ∈ GF(p). In
this representation of GF(p2) an element t of GF(p) is represented as −tα− tα2,
e.g. 3 is represented as −3α− 3α2. Arithmetic operations in GF(p2) are carried
out as follows.
For any x = x1α + x2α
2 ∈ GF(p2) we have that xp = xp1αp + xp2α2p =
x2α+ x1α
2. It follows that pth powering in GF(p2) does not require arithmetic
operations and can thus be considered to be for free. Squaring of x1α+ x2α
2 ∈
GF(p2) can be carried out at the cost of two squarings and a single multiplication
in GF(p), where as customary we do not count the cost of additions in GF(p).
Multiplication in GF(p2) can be done using four multiplications in GF(p). These
straightforward results can simply be improved to three squarings and three
multiplications, respectively, by using a Karatsuba-like approach (cf. [10]): to
compute (x1α + x2α
2) ∗ (y1α + y2α2) one computes x1 ∗ y1, x2 ∗ y2, and (x1 +
x2) ∗ (y1 + y2), after which x1 ∗ y2 + x2 ∗ y1 follows using two subtractions.
Furthermore, from (x1α + x2α
2)2 = x2(x2 − 2x1)α + x1(x1 − 2x2)α2 it follows
that squaring in GF(p2) can be done at the cost of two multiplications in GF(p).
Under the reasonable assumption that a squaring in GF(p) takes 80% of the
time of a multiplication in GF(p) (cf. [4]), two multiplications is faster than three
squarings. Finally, to compute x ∗ z − y ∗ zp ∈ GF(p2) for x, y, z ∈ GF(p2) four
multiplications in GF(p) suffice, because, with x = x1α+ x2α
2, y = y1α+ y2α
2,
and z = z1α+ z2α
2, it is easily verified that x ∗ z − y ∗ zp = (z1(y1 − x2 − y2) +
z2(x2 − x1 + y2))α+ (z1(x1 − x2 + y1) + z2(y2 − x1 − y1))α2. Thus we have the
following.
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i. Computing xp is for free.
ii. Computing x2 takes two multiplications in GF(p).
iii. Computing x ∗ y takes three multiplications in GF(p).
iv. Computing x ∗ z − y ∗ zp takes four multiplications in GF(p).
For comparison purposes we review the following well known results.
Lemma 2.12 Let x, y, z ∈ GF(p6) with p ≡ 2 mod 3, and let a, b ∈ Z with
0 < a, b < p. Assume that a squaring in GF(p) takes 80% of the time of a
multiplication in GF(p) (cf. [4]).
i. Computing x2 takes 14.4 multiplications in GF(p).
ii. Computing x ∗ y takes 18 multiplications in GF(p).
iii. Computing xa takes an expected 23.4 log2(a) multiplications in GF(p).
iv. Computing xa ∗ yb takes an expected 27.9 log2(max(a, b)) multiplications in
GF(p).
Proof. Since p ≡ 2 mod 3, GF(p6) can be represented using an optimal normal
basis over GF(p) so that the ‘reduction’ modulo the minimal polynomial does
not require any multiplications in GF(p). Squaring and multiplication in GF(p6)
can then be done in 18 squarings and multiplications in GF(p), respectively,
from which i and ii follow. For iii we use the ordinary square and multiply
method, so we get log2(a) squarings and an expected 0.5 log2(a) multiplica-
tions in GF(p6). For iv we use standard multi-exponentiation, which leads to
log2(max(a, b)) squarings and 0.75 log2(max(a, b)) multiplications in GF(p
6).
2.2 Traces
The conjugates over GF(p2) of h ∈ GF(p6) are h, hp2 , and hp4 . The trace Tr(h)
over GF(p2) of h ∈ GF(p6) is the sum of the conjugates over GF(p2) of h, i.e.,
Tr(h) = h+hp
2
+hp
4
. Because the order of h ∈ GF(p6)∗ divides p6−1, i.e., p6 ≡ 1
modulo the order of h, we have that Tr(h)p
2
= Tr(h), so that Tr(h) ∈ GF(p2).
For h1, h2 ∈ GF(p6) and c ∈ GF(p2) we have that Tr(h1+h2) = Tr(h1)+Tr(h2)
and Tr(c ∗ h1) = c ∗ Tr(h1). That is, the trace over GF(p2) is GF(p2)-linear.
Unless specified otherwise, conjugates and traces in this paper are over GF(p2).
The conjugates of g of order dividing p2− p+1 are g, gp−1 and g−p because
p2 ≡ p− 1 mod p2 − p+ 1 and p4 ≡ −p mod p2 − p+ 1.
Lemma 2.21 The roots of X3 − Tr(g)X2 + Tr(g)pX − 1 are the conjugates
of g.
Proof. We compare the coefficients of X3 − Tr(g)X2 + Tr(g)pX − 1 with the
coefficients of the polynomial (X−g)(X−gp−1)(X−g−p). The coefficient of X2
follows from g+gp−1+g−p = Tr(g), and the constant coefficient from g1+p−1−p =
1. The coefficient of X equals g ∗ gp−1 + g ∗ g−p + gp−1 ∗ g−p = gp + g1−p + g−1.
Because 1 − p ≡ −p2 mod p2 − p + 1 and −1 ≡ p2 − p mod p2 − p + 1, we find
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2
+ gp
2−p = (g + g−p + gp−1)p = Tr(g)p, which
completes the proof.
Similarly (and as proved below in Lemma 2.34.ii), the roots of X3−Tr(gn)X2+
Tr(gn)pX − 1 are the conjugates of gn. Thus, the conjugates of gn are fully
determined by X3 − Tr(gn)X2 + Tr(gn)pX − 1 and thus by Tr(gn). Since
Tr(gn) ∈ GF(p2) this leads to a compact representation of the conjugates of gn.
To be able to use this representation in an efficient manner in cryptographic pro-
tocols, we need an efficient way to compute Tr(gn) given Tr(g). Such a method
can be derived from properties of g and the trace function. However, since we
need a similar method in a more general context in Section 3, we consider the
properties of the polynomial X3 − cX2 + cpX − 1 for general c ∈ GF(p2) (as
opposed to c’s that are traces of powers of g).
2.3 The polynomial F (c, X)
Definition 2.31 For c ∈ GF(p2) let F (c,X) be the polynomial X3 − cX2 +
cpX − 1 ∈ GF(p2)[X] with (not necessarily distinct) roots h0, h1, h2 in GF(p6),
and let τ(c, n) = hn0 + h
n
1 + h
n
2 for n ∈ Z. We use the shorthand cn = τ(c, n).
In this subsection we derive some properties of F (c,X) and its roots.
Lemma 2.32
i. c = c1.
ii. h0 ∗ h1 ∗ h2 = 1.
iii. hn0 ∗ hn1 + hn0 ∗ hn2 + hn1 ∗ hn2 = c−n for n ∈ Z.
iv. F (c, h−pj ) = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2.
v. c−n = cnp = c
p
n for n ∈ Z.
vi. Either all hj have order dividing p
2 − p+ 1 and > 3 or all hj ∈ GF(p2).
vii. cn ∈ GF(p2) for n ∈ Z.
Proof. The proofs of i and ii are immediate and iii follows from ii . From
F (c, hj) = h
3
j − ch2j + cphj − 1 = 0 it follows that hj 6= 0 and that F (c, hj)p =
h3pj −cph2pj +cp
2
hpj −1 = 0. With cp
2
= c and hj 6= 0 it follows that −h3pj (h−3pj −
ch−2pj + c
ph−pj − 1) = −h3pj ∗ F (c, h−pj ) = 0, which proves iv.
From iv it follows, without loss of generality, that either hj = h
−p
j for j =
0, 1, 2, or h0 = h
−p
0 , h1 = h
−p
2 , and h2 = h
−p
1 , or that hj = h
−p
j+1 mod 3 for
j = 0, 1, 2. In either case v follows. Furthermore, in the first case all hj have
order dividing p + 1 and are thus in GF(p2). In the second case, h0 has order
dividing p+1, h1 = h
−p
2 = h
p2
1 and h2 = h
−p
1 = h
p2
2 so that h1 and h2 both have
order dividing p2−1. It follows that they are all again in GF(p2). In the last case
it follows from 1 = h0 ∗h1 ∗h2 that 1 = h0 ∗h−p2 ∗h−p0 = h0 ∗hp
2
0 ∗h−p0 = hp
2−p+1
0
so that h0 and similarly h1 and h2 have order dividing p
2 − p+ 1. If either one,
say h0, has order at most 3, then h0 has order 1 or 3 since p
2 − p + 1 is odd.
It follows that the order of h0 divides p
2 − 1 so that h0 ∈ GF(p2). But then h1
6and h2 are in GF(p
2) as well, because hj = h
−p
j+1 mod 3. It follows that in the last
case either all hj have order dividing p
2− p+1 and > 3, or all hj are in GF(p2),
which concludes the proof of vi.
If all hj ∈ GF(p2), then vii is immediate. Otherwise F (c,X) is irreducible
and its roots are the conjugates of h0. Thus cn = Tr(h
n
0 ) ∈ GF(p2) (cf. 2.2).
This concludes the proof of vii and Lemma 2.32.
Remark 2.33 It follows from Lemma 2.32.vi that F (c,X) ∈ GF(p2)[X] is ir-
reducible if and only if its roots have order dividing p2 − p+ 1 and > 3.
Lemma 2.34
i. cu+v = cu ∗ cv − cpv ∗ cu−v + cu−2v for u, v ∈ Z.
ii. F (cn, h
n
j ) = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 and n ∈ Z.
iii. F (c,X) is reducible over GF(p2) if and only if cp+1 ∈ GF(p).
Proof. With the definition of cn, c
p
n = c−n (cf. Lemma 2.32.v), and Lemma
2.32.ii, the proof of i follows from a straightforward computation.
For the proof of ii we compute the coefficients of (X−hn0 )(X−hn1 )(X−hn2 ).
We find that the coefficient of X2 equals −cn and that the constant coefficient
equals −hn0 ∗hn1 ∗hn2 = −(h0 ∗h1 ∗h2)n = −1 (cf. Lemma 2.32.ii). The coefficient
of X equals hn0 ∗ hn1 + hn0 ∗ hn2 + hn1 ∗ hn2 = c−n = cpn (cf. Lemma 2.32.iii and v).
It follows that (X − hn0 )(X − hn1 )(X − hn2 ) = F (cn, X) from which ii follows.
If F (c,X) is reducible then all hj are in GF(p
2) (cf. Remark 2.33 and Lemma
2.32.vi). It follows that h
(p+1)p
j = h
p+1
j so that h
p+1
j ∈ GF(p) for j = 0, 1, 2 and
cp+1 ∈ GF(p). Conversely, if cp+1 ∈ GF(p), then cpp+1 = cp+1 and F (cp+1, X) =
X3−cp+1X2+cp+1X−1. Thus, F (cp+1, 1) = 0. Because the roots of F (cp+1, X)
are the (p + 1)st powers of the roots of F (c,X) (cf. iv), it follows that F (c,X)
has a root of order dividing p+ 1, i.e., an element of GF(p2), so that F (c,X) is
reducible over GF(p2). This proves iii.
Lemma 2.32.v and Lemma 2.34.i lead to a fast algorithm to compute cn for any
n ∈ Z.
Corollary 2.35 Let c, cn−1, cn, and cn+1 be given.
i. Computing c2n = c
2
n − 2cpn takes two multiplications in GF(p).
ii. Computing cn+2 = c∗cn+1−cp∗cn+cn−1 takes four multiplications in GF(p).
iii. Computing c2n−1 = cn−1 ∗ cn − cp ∗ cpn + cpn+1 takes four multiplications in
GF(p).
iv. Computing c2n+1 = cn+1 ∗ cn − c ∗ cpn + cpn−1 takes four multiplications in
GF(p).
Proof. The identities follow from Lemma 2.32.v and Lemma 2.34.i: with u =
v = n and c0 = 3 for i, with u = n+ 1 and v = 1 for ii, u = n− 1, v = n for iii,
and u = n+ 1, v = n for iv. The cost analysis follows from Lemma 2.11.
Definition 2.36 Let Sn(c) = (cn−1, cn, cn+1) ∈ GF(p2)3.
7Algorithm 2.37 (Computation of Sn(c) given c) If n < 0, apply this algo-
rithm to −n and use Lemma 2.32.v. If n = 0, then S0(c) = (cp, 3, c) (cf. Lemma
2.32.v). If n = 1, then S1(c) = (3, c, c
2 − 2cp) (cf. Corollary 2.35.i). If n = 2,
use Corollary 2.35.ii and S1(c) to compute c3 and thereby S2(n). Otherwise, to
compute Sn(c) for n > 2 let m = n. If m is even, then replace m by m− 1. Let
S¯t(c) = S2t+1(c) for t ∈ Z, k = 1, and compute S¯k(c) = S3(c) using Corollary
2.35.ii and S(2). Let (m− 1)/2 = ∑rj=0 mj2j with mj ∈ {0, 1} and mr = 1. For
j = r − 1, r − 2, . . . , 0 in succession do the following:
– If mj = 0 then use S¯k(c) = (c2k, c2k+1, c2k+2) to compute S¯2k(c) = (c4k,
c4k+1, c4k+2) (using Corollary 2.35.i for c4k and c4k+2 and Corollary 2.35.iii
for c4k+1) and replace k by 2k.
– If mj = 1 then use S¯k(c) = (c2k, c2k+1, c2k+2) to compute S¯2k+1(c) =
(c4k+2, c4k+3, c4k+4) (using Corollary 2.35.i for c4k+2 and c4k+4 and Corol-
lary 2.35.iv for c4k+3) and replace k by 2k + 1,
After this iteration we have that 2k+1 = m so that Sm(c) = S¯k(c). If n is even
use Sm(c) = (cm−1, cm, cm+1) to compute Sm+1(c) = (cm, cm+1, cm+2) (using
Corollary 2.35.ii) and replace m by m+ 1. As a result we have Sn(c) = Sm(c).
Theorem 2.38 Given the sum c of the roots of F (c,X), computing the sum cn
of the nth powers of the roots takes 8 log2(n) multiplications in GF(p).
Proof. Immediate from Algorithm 2.37 and Corollary 2.35.
Remark 2.39 The only difference between the two different cases in Algorithm
2.37 (i.e., if the bit is off or on) is the application of Corollary 2.35.iii if the bit
is off and of Corollary 2.35.iv if the bit is on. The two computations involved,
however, are very similar and take the same number of instructions. Thus, the
instructions carried out in Algorithm 2.37 for the two different cases are very
much alike. This is a rather unusual property for an exponentiation routine and
makes Algorithm 2.37 much less susceptible than usual exponentiation routines
to environmental attacks such as timing attacks and Differential Power Analysis.
2.4 Computing with traces
It follows from Lemma 2.21 and Lemma 2.34.ii that
Sn(Tr(g)) = (Tr(g
n−1), T r(gn), T r(gn+1))
(cf. Definition 2.36). Furthermore, given Tr(g) Algorithm 2.37 can be used to
compute Sn(Tr(g)) for any n. Since the order of g equals q this takes 8 log2(n mod
q) multiplications in GF(p) (cf. Theorem 2.38). According to Lemma 2.12.iii
computing gn given g can be expected to take 23.4 log2(q) multiplications in
GF(p). Thus, computing Tr(gn) given Tr(g) is almost three times faster than
computing gn given g. Furthermore, Tr(gn) ∈ GF(p2) whereas gn ∈ GF(p6).
So representing, storing, or transmitting Tr(gn) is three times cheaper than it
is for gn. Unlike the methods from for instance [2], we do not assume that p
8has a special form. Using such primes leads to additional savings by making the
arithmetic in GF(p) faster (cf. Algorithm 3.11).
Thus, we replace the traditional representation of powers of g by their traces.
The ability to quickly compute Tr(gn) based on Tr(g) suffices for the imple-
mentation of many cryptographic protocols (cf. Section 4). In some protocols,
however, the product of two powers of g must be computed. For the standard
representation this is straightforward, but if traces are used, then computing
products is relatively complicated. We describe how this problem may be solved
in the cryptographic applications that we are aware of. Let Tr(g) ∈ GF(p2) and
Sk(Tr(g)) ∈ GF(p2)3 (cf. Definition 2.36) be given for some secret integer k
(the private key) with 0 < k < q. We show that Tr(ga ∗ gbk) can be computed
efficiently for any a, b ∈ Z.
Definition 2.41 Let A(c) =


0 0 1
1 0 −cp
0 1 c

 and Mn(c) =


cn−2 cn−1 cn
cn−1 cn cn+1
cn cn+1 cn+2

 be
3 × 3-matrices over GF(p2) with c and cn as in Definition 2.31, and let C(V )
denote the center column of a 3× 3 matrix V .
Lemma 2.42 Sn(c) = Sm(c) ∗ A(c)n−m and Mn(c) = Mm(c) ∗ A(c)n−m for
n,m ∈ Z.
Proof. For n −m = 1 the first statement is equivalent with Corollary 2.35.ii.
The proof follows by induction to n−m.
Corollary 2.43 cn = Sm(c) ∗ C(A(c)n−m).
Lemma 2.44 The determinant of M0(c) equals D = c
2p+2 + 18cp+1 − 4(c3p +
c3)− 27 ∈ GF(p). If D 6= 0 then
M0(c)
−1 =
1
D
∗


2c2 − 6cp 2c2p + 3c− cp+2 cp+1 − 9
2c2p + 3c− cp+2 (c2 − 2cp)p+1 − 9 (2c2p + 3c− cp+2)p
cp+1 − 9 (2c2p + 3c− cp+2)p (2c2 − 6cp)p

 .
Proof. This follows from a simple computation using Lemma 2.32.v and Corol-
lary 2.35 combined with the fact that x ∈ GF(p) if xp = x.
Lemma 2.45 det(M0(Tr(g))) = (Tr(g
p+1)p − Tr(gp+1))2 6= 0.
Proof. This follows by observing that M0(Tr(g)) is the product of the Vander-
monde matrix


g−1 g−p
2
g−p
4
1 1 1
g gp
2
gp
4

 and its inverse, and therefore invertible. The
determinant of the Vandermonde matrix equals Tr(gp+1)p − Tr(gp+1).
Lemma 2.46 A(Tr(g))n = M0(Tr(g))
−1 ∗ Mn(Tr(g)) can be computed in a
small constant number of operations in GF(p2) given Tr(g) and Sn(Tr(g)).
9Proof. Tr(gn±2) and thus Mn(Tr(g)) can be computed from Sn(Tr(g)) using
Corollary 2.35.ii. The proof follows from Lemmas 2.42, 2.44, 2.45, and 2.11.i.
Corollary 2.47 C(A(Tr(g))n) = M0(Tr(g))
−1 ∗ (Sn(Tr(g)))T .
Algorithm 2.48 (Computation of Tr(ga ∗ gbk)) Let Tr(g), Sk(Tr(g)) (for
unknown k), and a, b ∈ Z with 0 < a, b < q be given.
1. Compute e = a/b mod q.
2. Compute Se(Tr(g)) (cf. Algorithm 2.37).
3. Compute C(A(Tr(g))e) based on Tr(g) and Se(Tr(g)) using Corollary 2.47.
4. Compute Tr(ge+k) = Sk(Tr(g)) ∗ C(A(Tr(g))e) (cf. Corollary 2.43).
5. Compute Sb(Tr(g
e+k)) (cf. Algorithm 2.37), and return Tr(g(e+k)b) = Tr(ga∗
gbk).
Theorem 2.49 GivenM0(Tr(g))
−1, Tr(g), and Sk(Tr(g)) = (Tr(g
k−1), T r(gk),
T r(gk+1)) the trace Tr(ga∗gbk) of ga∗gbk can be computed at a cost of 8 log2(a/b
modq) + 8 log2(b) + 34 multiplications in GF(p).
Proof. The proof follows from a straightforward analysis of the cost of the
required matrix vector operations and Theorem 2.38.
Assuming that M0(Tr(g))
−1 is computed once and for all (at the cost of a small
constant number of operations in GF(p2)), we find that Tr(ga ∗ gbk) can be
computed at a cost of 16 log2(q) multiplications in GF(p). According to Lemma
2.12.iv this computation would cost about 27.9 log2(q) multiplications in GF(p)
using the traditional representation. Thus, in this case the trace representation
achieves a speed-up of a factor 1.75 over the traditional one. We conclude that
both single and double exponentiations can be done substantially faster using
traces than using previously published techniques.
3 Parameter selection
3.1 Finite field and subgroup size selection
We describe fast and practical methods to select the field characteristic p and
subgroup size q such that q divides p2 − p + 1. Denote by P and Q the sizes
of the primes p and q to be generated, respectively. To achieve security at least
equivalent to 1024-bit RSA, 6P should be set to about 1024, i.e., P ≈ 170, and
Q can for instance be set at 160. Given current cryptanalytic methods we do
not recommend choosing P much smaller than Q.
Algorithm 3.11 (Selection of q and ‘nice’ p) Find r ∈ Z such that q =
r2− r+1 is a Q-bit prime, and next find k ∈ Z such that p = r+k ∗ q is a P -bit
prime that is 2 mod 3.
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Algorithm 3.11 is quite fast and it can be used to find primes p that satisfy
a degree two polynomial with small coefficients. Such p lead to fast arithmetic
operations in GF(p). In particular if the search for k is restricted to k = 1 (i.e.,
search for an r such that both r2 − r + 1 and r2 + 1 are prime and such that
r2 + 1 ≡ 2 mod 3) the primes p have a very nice form; note that in this case
r must be even and p ≡ 1 mod 4. On the other hand, such ‘nice’ p may be
undesirable from a security point of view because they may make application
of the Discrete Logarithm variant of the Number Field Sieve easier. Another
method to generate p and q that does not have this disadvantage (and thus
neither the advantage of fast arithmetic modulo p) is the following.
Algorithm 3.12 (Selection of q and p) First, select aQ-bit prime q ≡ 7 mod
12. Next, find the roots r1 and r2 ofX
2−X+1 mod q. It follows from q ≡ 1 mod 3
and quadratic reciprocity that r1 and r2 exist. Since q ≡ 3 mod 4 they can be
found using a single ((q+1)/4)th powering modulo q. Finally, find a k ∈ Z such
that p = ri + k ∗ q is a P -bit prime that is 2 mod 3 for i = 1 or 2.
The run time of Algorithms 3.11 and 3.12 is dominated by the time to find the
primes q and p. A precise analysis is straightforward and left to the reader.
3.2 Subgroup selection
We consider the problem of finding a proper Tr(g) for an element g ∈ GF(p6)
of order q dividing p2−p+1 and > 3. Note that there is no need to find g itself,
finding Tr(g) suffices. Given Tr(g) for an unspecified g, a subgroup generator
can be computed by finding a root in GF(p6) of F (Tr(g), X). We refer to this
generator as g and to the order q subgroup 〈g〉 as the XTR group. Note that all
roots of F (Tr(g), X) lead to the same XTR group.
A straightforward approach to find Tr(g) would be to find a third degree ir-
reducible polynomial over GF(p2), use it to represent GF(p6), to pick an element
h ∈ GF(p6) until h(p6−1)/q 6= 1, to take g = h(p6−1)/q, and to compute Tr(g).
Although conceptually easy, this method is less attractive from an implementa-
tion point of view. A faster method that is also easier to implement is based on
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.21 For a randomly selected c ∈ GF(p2) the probability that F (c,X) ∈
GF(p2)[X] is irreducible is about one third.
Proof. This follows from a straightforward counting argument. About p2 − p
elements of the subgroup of order p2 − p + 1 of GF(p6)∗ are roots of monic
irreducible polynomials of the form F (c,X) (cf. Lemma 2.21 and Lemma 2.34.ii).
Since each of these polynomials has three distinct roots, there must be about
(p2−p)/3 different values for c in GF(p2)\GF(p) such that F (c,X) is irreducible.
With Remark 2.33 it follows that it suffices to pick a c ∈ GF(p2) until F (c,X) is
irreducible and until c(p2−p+1)/q 6= 3 (cf. Definition 2.31), and to take Tr(g) =
c(p2−p+1)/q. The resulting Tr(g) is the trace of some g of order q, but explicit
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computation of g is avoided. As shown in [13] the irreducibility test for F (c,X) ∈
GF(p2)[X] can be done very fast, but, obviously, it requires additional code.
We now present a method that requires hardly any additional code on top of
Algorithm 2.37.
Algorithm 3.22 (Computation of Tr(g))
1. Pick c ∈ GF(p2)\GF(p) at random and compute cp+1 using Algorithm 2.37.
2. If cp+1 ∈ GF(p) then return to Step 1.
3. Compute c(p2−p+1)/q using Algorithm 2.37.
4. If c(p2−p+1)/q = 3, then return to Step 1.
5. Let Tr(g) = c(p2−p+1)/q.
Theorem 3.23 Algorithm 3.22 computes an element of GF(p2) that equals Tr(g)
for some g ∈ GF(p6) of order q. It can be expected to require 3q/(q − 1) ap-
plications of Algorithm 2.37 with n = p + 1 and q/(q − 1) applications with
n = (p2 − p+ 1)/q.
Proof. The correctness of Algorithm 3.22 follows from the fact that F (c,X) is
irreducible if cp+1 6∈ GF(p) (cf. Lemma 2.34.iii). The run time estimate follows
from Lemma 3.21 and the fact that cp+1 6∈ GF(p) if F (c,X) is irreducible (cf.
Lemma 2.34.iii).
In [13] we present an even faster method to compute Tr(g) if p 6≡ 8 mod 9.
3.3 Key size
The XTR public key data contain two primes p and q as in 3.1 and the trace
Tr(g) of a generator of the XTR group (cf. 3.2). In principle the XTR public
key data p, q, and Tr(g) can be shared among any number of participants, just
as in DSA (and EC-DSA) finite field (and curve), subgroup order, and subgroup
generator may be shared. Apart from the part that may be shared, someone’s
XTR public key may also contain a public point Tr(gk) for an integer k that
is kept secret (the private key). Furthermore, for some applications the values
Tr(gk−1) and Tr(gk+1) are required as well (cf. Section 4). In this section we
discuss how much overhead is required for the representation of the XTR public
key in a certificate, i.e., on top of the user ID and other certification related bits.
The part (p, q, T r(g)) that may be shared causes overhead only if it is not
shared. In that case, (p, q, T r(g)) may be assumed to belong to a particular user
or group of users in which case it is straightforward to determine (p, q, T r(g)),
during initialization, as a function of the user (or user group) ID and a small
number of additional bits. For any reasonable choice of P and Q (cf. 3.1) the
number of additional bits on top of the user ID, i.e., the overhead, can easily
be limited to 48 (6 bytes) (cf. [13]), at the cost of a one time application of
Algorithm 2.37 with n = (p2 − p+ 1)/q by the recipient of the public key data.
We are not aware of a method to reduce the overhead caused by a user’s public
point Tr(gk) ∈ GF(p2). Thus, representing Tr(gk) in a certificate requires rep-
resentation of 2P bits. The two additional values Tr(gk−1), T r(gk+1) ∈ GF(p2),
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however, can be represented using far fewer than 4P bits, at the cost of a very
reasonable one time computation by the recipient of the public key.
This can be seen as follows. Since det(A(c)k) = 1, the equation from Lemma
2.46 leads to a third degree equation in Tr(gk−1), given Tr(g), Tr(gk), and
Tr(gk+1), by taking the determinants of the matrices involved. Thus, at the
cost of a small number of pth powerings in GF(p2), Tr(gk−1) can be deter-
mined based on Tr(g), Tr(gk), and Tr(gk+1) and two bits to indicate which
of the roots equals Tr(gk−1). In [13] we present, among others, a conceptually
more complicated method to determine Tr(gk−1) based on Tr(g), Tr(gk), and
Tr(gk+1) that requires only a small constant number of operations in GF(p), and
a method to quickly determine Tr(gk+1) given Tr(g) and Tr(gk) that works if
p 6≡ 8 mod 9. Because this condition is not unduly restrictive we may assume
that the two additional values Tr(gk−1), T r(gk+1) ∈ GF(p2) do not have to be
included in the XTR public key data, assuming the public key recipient is able
and willing to carry out a fast one time computation given the XTR public
key data (p, q, T r(g), T r(gk)). If this computation if infeasible for the recipient,
then Tr(gk+1) must be included in the XTR public key data; computation of
Tr(gk−1) then takes only a small constant number of operations in GF(p).
4 Cryptographic applications
XTR can be used in any cryptosystem that relies on the (subgroup) discrete
logarithm problem. In this section we describe some applications of XTR in
more detail: Diffie-Hellman key agreement in 4.1, ElGamal encryption in 4.2,
and Nyberg-Rueppel message recovery digital signatures in 4.3, and we compare
XTR to RSA and ECC (cf. [15]).
4.1 XTR-DH
Suppose that Alice and Bob who both have access to the XTR public key data
p, q, Tr(g) want to agree on a shared secret key K. This can be done using the
following XTR version of the Diffie-Hellman protocol:
1. Alice selects at random a ∈ Z, 1 < a < q − 2, uses Algorithm 2.37 to
compute Sa(Tr(g)) = (Tr(g
a−1), T r(ga), T r(ga+1)) ∈ GF(p2)3, and sends
Tr(ga) ∈ GF(p2) to Bob.
2. Bob receives Tr(ga) from Alice, selects at random b ∈ Z, 1 < b < q − 2,
uses Algorithm 2.37 to compute Sb(Tr(g)) = (Tr(g
b−1), T r(gb), T r(gb+1)) ∈
GF(p2)3, and sends Tr(gb) ∈ GF(p2) to Alice.
3. Alice receives Tr(gb) from Bob, uses Algorithm 2.37 to compute Sa(Tr(g
b)) =
(Tr(g(a−1)b), T r(gab), T r(g(a+1)b)) ∈ GF(p2)3, and determines K based on
Tr(gab) ∈ GF(p2).
4. Bob uses Algorithm 2.37 to compute Sb(Tr(g
a)) = (Tr(ga(b−1)), T r(gab),
T r(ga(b+1))) ∈ GF(p2)3, and determines K based on Tr(gab) ∈ GF(p2).
The communication and computational overhead of XTR-DH are both about
one third of traditional implementations of the Diffie-Hellman protocol that are
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based on subgroups of multiplicative groups of finite fields, and that achieve the
same level of security (cf. Subsection 2.4).
4.2 XTR-ElGamal encryption
Suppose that Alice is the owner of the XTR public key data p, q, Tr(g), and that
Alice has selected a secret integer k, computed Sk(Tr(g)), and made public the
resulting value Tr(gk). Given Alice’s XTR public key data (p, q, T r(g), T r(gk)),
Bob can encrypt a messageM intended for Alice using the following XTR version
of the ElGamal encryption protocol:
1. Bob selects at random b ∈ Z, 1 < b < q − 2, and uses Algorithm 2.37 to
compute Sb(Tr(g)) = (Tr(g
b−1), T r(gb), T r(gb+1)) ∈ GF(p2)3.
2. Bob uses Algorithm 2.37 to compute Sb(Tr(g
k)) = (Tr(g(b−1)k), T r(gbk),
T r(g(b+1)k)) ∈ GF(p2)3.
3. Bob determines a symmetric encryption key K based on Tr(gbk) ∈ GF(p2).
4. Bob uses an agreed upon symmetric encryption method with key K to en-
crypt M , resulting in the encryption E.
5. Bob sends (Tr(gb), E) to Alice.
Upon receipt of (Tr(gb), E), Alice decrypts the message in the following way:
1. Alice uses Algorithm 2.37 to compute Sk(Tr(g
b)) = (Tr(gb(k−1)), T r(gbk),
T r(gb(k+1))) ∈ GF(p2)3.
2. Alice determines the symmetric encryption keyK based on Tr(gbk) ∈ GF(p2).
3. Alice uses the agreed upon symmetric encryption method with key K to
decrypt E, resulting in the encryption M .
The message (Tr(gb), E) sent by Bob consists of the actual encryption E, whose
length strongly depends on the length of M , and the overhead Tr(gb) ∈ GF(p2),
whose length is independent of the length of M . The communication and com-
putational overhead of XTR-ElGamal encryption are both about one third of
traditional implementations of the ElGamal encryption protocol that are based
on subgroups of multiplicative groups of finite fields, and that achieve the same
level of security (cf. Subsection 2.4).
Remark 4.21 XTR-ElGamal encryption as described above is based on the
common hybrid version of ElGamal’s method, i.e., where the key K is used in
conjunction with an agreed upon symmetric key encryption method. In more
traditional ElGamal encryption the message is restricted to the key space and
‘encrypted’ using, for instance, multiplication by the key, an invertible operation
that takes place in the key space. In our description this would amount to re-
quiring that M ∈ GF(p2), and by computing E as K ∗M ∈ GF(p2). Compared
to non-hybrid ElGamal encryption, XTR saves a factor three on the length of
both parts of the encrypted message, for messages that fit in the key space (of
one third of the ‘traditional’ size).
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Remark 4.22 As in other descriptions of ElGamal encryption it is implicitly
assumed that the first component of an ElGamal encrypted message represents
Tr(gb), i.e., the conjugates of a power of g. This should be explicitly verified in
some situations, by checking that Tr(gb) ∈ GF(p2)\GF(p), that Tr(gb) 6= 3, and
by using Algorithm 2.37 to compute Sq(Tr(g
b)) = (Tr(gb(q−1)), T r(gbq), T r(gb(q+1)))
and to verify that Tr(gbq) = 3. This follows using methods similar to the ones
presented in Section 3.
4.3 XTR-Nyberg-Rueppel signatures
Let, as in 4.2, Alice’s XTR public key data consist of p, q, Tr(g), and Tr(gk). Fur-
thermore, assume that Tr(gk−1) and Tr(gk+1) (and thus Sk(Tr(g))) are avail-
able to the verifier, either because they are part of the public key, or because they
were reconstructed by the verifier (either from (p, q, T r(g), T r(gk), T r(gk+1)) or
from (p, q, T r(g), T r(gk))). We describe the XTR version of the Nyberg-Rueppel
(NR) message recovery signature scheme, but XTR can also be used in other
‘ElGamal-like’ signature schemes. To sign a message M containing an agreed
upon type of redundancy, Alice does the following:
1. Alice selects at random a ∈ Z, 1 < a < q − 2, and uses Algorithm 2.37 to
compute Sa(Tr(g)) = (Tr(g
a−1), T r(ga), T r(ga+1)) ∈ GF(p2)3.
2. Alice determines a symmetric encryption key K based on Tr(ga) ∈ GF(p2).
3. Alice uses an agreed upon symmetric encryption method with key K to
encrypt M , resulting in the encryption E.
4. Alice computes the (integer valued) hash h of E.
5. Alice computes s = (k ∗ h+ a) mod q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}.
6. Alice’s resulting signature on M is (E, s).
To verify Alice’s signature (E, s) and to recover the signed message M , the
verifier Bob does the following.
1. Bob checks that 0 ≤ s < q; if not failure.
2. Bob computes the hash h of E.
3. Bob replaces h by −h mod q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}.
4. Bob uses Algorithm 2.48 to compute Tr(gs ∗ ghk) based on Tr(g) and
Sk(Tr(g)).
5. Bob uses Tr(gs ∗ ghk) (which equals Tr(ga)) to decrypt E resulting in M .
6. The signature is accepted ⇐⇒ M contains the agreed upon redundancy.
XTR-NR is considerably faster than traditional implementations of the NR
scheme that are based on subgroups of multiplicative groups of finite fields of
the same security level. The length of the signature is identical to other variants
of the hybrid version of the NR scheme (cf. Remark 4.21): an overhead part of
length depending on the desired security (i.e., the subgroup size) and a message
part of length depending on the message itself and the agreed upon redundancy.
Similar statements hold for other digital signature schemes, such as DSA.
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4.4 Comparison to RSA and ECC
We compare XTR to RSA and ECC. For the RSA comparison we give the run
times of 1020-bit RSA and 170-bit XTR obtained using generic software. For
ECC we assume random curves over prime fields of about 170-bits with a curve
subgroup of 170-bit order, and we compare the number of multiplications in
GF(p) required for 170-bit ECC and 170-bit XTR applications. This ‘theoretical’
comparison is used because we do not have access to ECC software.
If part of the public key is shared (ECC or XTR only), XTR and ECC
public keys consist of just the public point. For ECC its y-coordinate can be
derived from the x-coordinate and a single bit. In the non-shared case, pub-
lic keys may be ID-based or non-ID-based1. For ECC, the finite field, random
curve, and group order take ≈ 595 bits, plus a small number of bits for a point
of high order. Using methods similar to the one alluded to in Subsection 3.3
this can be reduced to an overhead of, say, 48 bits (to generate curve and field
based on the ID and 48 bits) plus 85 bits for the group order information. For
XTR the sizes given in Table 1 follow from Subsection 3.3. For both RSA
Table 1. RSA, XTR, ECC key sizes and RSA, XTR run times.
shared ID-based non-ID-based key encrypting decrypting
keysize keysize keysize selection (verifying) (signing)
1020-bit RSA n/a 510 bits 1050 bits 1224 ms 5 ms 40 (no CRT: 123) ms
170-bit XTR 340 388 bits 680 bits 73 ms 23 ms 11 ms
170-bit ECC 171 304 bits 766 bits
Table 2. 170-bit ECC, XTR comparison of number of multiplications in GF(p).
encrypting decrypting encryption signing verifying signature DH speed DH size
overhead overhead
ECC 3400 1921 (1700) 171 (340) bits 1700 2575 170 bits 3842 (3400) 171 (340) bits
XTR 2720 1360 340 bits 1360 2754 170 bits 2720 340 bits
and XTR 100 random keys were generated. (ECC parameter generation is much
slower and more complicated than for either RSA or XTR and not included in
Table 1.) For RSA we used random 32-bit odd public exponents and 1020-bit
moduli picked by randomly selecting 510-bit odd numbers and adding 2 until
they are prime. For XTR we used Algorithm 3.12 with Q = 170 and P ≥ 170
and the fast Tr(g) initialization method mentioned at the end of Subsection 3.2.
For each RSA key 10 encryptions and decryptions of random 1020-bit messages
were carried out, the latter with Chinese remaindering (CRT) and without (in
parentheses in Table 1). For each XTR key 10 single and double exponentiations
(i.e., applications of Algorithms 2.37 and 2.48, respectively) were carried out for
random exponents < q. For RSA encryption and decryption correspond to sig-
nature verification and generation, respectively. For XTR single exponentiation
corresponds to decryption and signature generation, and double exponentiation
1 ID based key generation for RSA affects the way the secret factors are determined.
The ID based approach for RSA is therefore viewed with suspicion and not generally
used. A method from [23], for instance, has been broken, but no attack against the
methods from [12] is known. For discrete logarithm based methods (such as ECC
and XTR) ID-based key generation affects only the part of the public key that is not
related to the secret information, and is therefore not uncommon for such systems.
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corresponds to signature verification and, approximately, encryption. The aver-
age run times are in milliseconds on a 450 MHz Pentium II NT workstation. The
ECC figures in Table 2 are based on the results from [4]; speed-ups that may
be obtained at the cost of specifying the full y-coordinates are given between
parentheses. The time or number of operations to reconstruct the full public
keys from their compressed versions (for either system) is not included.
5 Security
5.1 Discrete logarithms in GF(pt)
Let 〈γ〉 be a multiplicative group of order ω. The security of the Diffie-Hellman
protocol in 〈γ〉 relies on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem of computing γxy
given γx and γy. We write DH(γx, γy) = γxy. Two other problems are related
to the DH problem. The first one is the Diffie-Hellman Decision (DHD) problem:
given a, b, c ∈ 〈γ〉 determine whether c = DH(a, b). The DH problem is at least
as difficult as the DHD problem. The second one is the Discrete Logarithm (DL)
problem: given a = γx ∈ 〈γ〉 with 0 ≤ x < ω, find x = DL(a). The DL problem
is at least as difficult as the DH problem. It is widely assumed that if the DL
problem in 〈γ〉 is intractable, then so are the other two. Given the factorization
of ω, the DL problem in 〈γ〉 can be reduced to the DL problem in all prime order
subgroups of 〈γ〉, due to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [17]. Thus, for the DL
problem we may assume that ω is prime.
Let p, q, Tr(g) be (part of) an XTR public key. Below we prove that the
security of the XTR versions of the DL, DHD, and DH problem is equivalent to
the DL, DHD, and DH problem, respectively, in the XTR group (cf. Subsection
3.2). First, however, we focus on the DL problem in a subgroup 〈γ〉 of prime
order ω of the multiplicative group GF(pt)∗ of an extension field GF(pt) of
GF(p) for a fixed t. There are two approaches to this problem (cf. [1], [5], [9],
[11], [16], [19], [21]): one can either attack the multiplicative group or one can
attack the subgroup. For the first attack the best known method is the Discrete
Logarithm variant of the Number Field Sieve. If s is the smallest divisor of t
such that 〈γ〉 can be embedded in the subgroup GF(ps)∗ of GF(pt)∗, then the
heuristic expected asymptotic run time for this attack is L[ps, 1/3, 1.923], where
L[n, v, u] = exp((u + o(1))(ln(n))v(ln(ln(n)))1−v). If p is small, e.g. p = 2, then
the constant 1.923 can be replaced by 1.53. Alternatively, one can use one of
several methods that take O(
√
ω) operations in 〈γ〉, such as Pollard’s Birthday
Paradox based rho method (cf. [18]).
This implies that the difficulty of the DL problem in 〈γ〉 depends on the size
of the minimal surrounding subfield of 〈γ〉 and on the size of its prime order ω. If
GF(pt) itself is the minimal surrounding subfield of 〈γ〉 and ω is sufficiently large,
then the DL problem in 〈γ〉 is as hard as the general DL problem in GF(pt). If
p is not small the latter problem is believed to be as hard as the DL problem
with respect to a generator of prime order ≈ ω in the multiplicative group of a
prime field of cardinality ≈ pt (cf. [6], [20]). The DL problem in that setting is
generally considered to be harder than factoring t ∗ log2(p)-bit RSA moduli.
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The XTR parameters are chosen in such away that the minimal surround-
ing field of the XTR group is equal to GF(p6) (cf. Section 1), such that p is
not small, and such that q is sufficiently large. It follows that, if the complexity
of the DL problem in the XTR group is less than the complexity of the DL
problem in GF(p6), then the latter problem is at most as hard as the DL prob-
lem in GF(p3), GF(p2), or GF(p), i.e., the DL problem in GF(p6) collapses to
its true subfields. This contradicts the above mentioned assumption about the
complexity of computing discrete logarithms in GF(pt). It follows that the DL
problem in the XTR group may be assumed to be as hard as the DL problem
in GF(p6), i.e., of complexity L[p6, 1/3, 1.923]. Thus, with respect to known at-
tacks, the DL problem in the XTR group is generally considered to be more
difficult than factoring a 6 ∗ log2(p)-bit RSA modulus, provided the prime order
q is sufficiently large. By comparing the computational effort required for both
algorithms mentioned above, it turns out that if p and q each are about 170 bits
long, then the DL problem in the XTR group is harder than factoring an RSA
modulus of 6 ∗ 170 = 1020 bits.
5.2 Security of XTR
Discrete logarithm based cryptographic protocols can use many different types
of subgroups, such as multiplicative groups of finite fields, subgroups thereof
(such as the XTR group), or groups of points of elliptic curves over finite fields.
As shown in Section 4 the XTR versions of these protocols follow by replacing
elements of the XTR group by their traces. This implies that the security of
those XTR versions is no longer based on the original DH, DHD, or DL problems
but on the XTR versions of those problems. We define the XTR-DH problem
as the problem of computing Tr(gxy) given Tr(gx) and Tr(gy), and we write
XDH(gx, gy) = gxy. The XTR-DHD problem is the problem of determining
whether XDH(a, b) = c for a, b, c ∈ Tr(〈g〉). Given a ∈ Tr(〈g〉), the XTR-DL
problem is to find x = XDL(a), i.e., 0 ≤ x < q such that a = Tr(gx). Note that
if x = DL(a), then so are x ∗ p2 mod q and x ∗ p4 mod q.
We say that problem A is (a, b)-equivalent to problem B, if any instance of
problem A (or B) can be solved by at most a (or b) calls to an algorithm solving
problem B (or A).
Theorem 5.21 The following equivalences hold:
i. The XTR-DL problem is (1, 1)-equivalent to the DL problem in 〈g〉.
ii. The XTR-DH problem is (1, 2) equivalent to the DH problem in 〈g〉.
iii. The XTR-DHD problem is (3, 2)-equivalent to the DHD problem in 〈g〉.
Proof. For a ∈ GF(p2) let r(a) denote a root of F (a,X).
To compute DL(y), let x = XDL(Tr(y)), then DL(y) = x ∗ p2j mod q for
either j = 0, j = 1, or j = 2. Conversely, XDL(a) = DL(r(a)). This proves i.
To compute DH(x, y), compute di = XDH(Tr(x ∗ gi), T r(y)) for i = 0, 1,
then r(di) ∈ {(DH(x, y) ∗ yi)p2j : j = 0, 1, 2}, from which DH(x, y) follows.
Conversely, XDH(a, b) = Tr(DH(r(a), r(b))). This proves ii.
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To prove iii, it easily follows that DH(x, y) = z if and only if XDH(Tr(x),
T r(y)) = Tr(z) andXDH(Tr(x∗g), T r(y)) = Tr(z∗y). Conversely,XDH(a, b) =
c if and only if DH(r(a), r(b)) = r(c)p
2j
for either j = 0, j = 1, or j = 2. This
proves iii and completes the proof of Theorem 5.21.
Remark 5.22 It follows from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 5.21 that
an algorithm solving either DL, DH, or DHD with non-negligible probability can
be transformed in an algorithm solving the corresponding XTR problem with
non-negligible probability, and vice versa.
It follows from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 5.21.ii that in many
practical situations a single call to an XTR-DH solving algorithm would suffice
to solve a DL problem. As an example we mention DH key agreement where the
resulting key is actually used after it has been established.
Remark 5.23 Theorem 5.21.ii states that determining the (small) XTR-DH
key is as hard as determining the whole DH key in the representation group
〈g〉. From the results in [24] it actually follows that determining the image of
the XTR-DH key under any non-trivial GF(p)-linear function is also as hard
as the whole DH key. This means that, for example, finding the α or the α2
coefficient of the XTR-DH key is as hard as finding the whole DH key, implying
that cryptographic applications may be based on just one of the coefficients.
6 Extensions
The methods and techniques described in this paper can be extended in various
straightforward ways to the situation where the underlying field GF(p) is itself
an extension field, say of the form GF(pe) for some integer e. The resulting field
will then be of the form GF(p6e) instead of GF(p6). The parameters p, q, and e
should be generated so that
– q is a prime dividing the 6eth cyclotomic polynomial φ6e(X) evaluated in p
(cf. [11]).
– log2(q) and 6e ∗ log2(p) are sufficiently large, e.g. log2(q) ≥ 160 and 6e ∗
log2(p) > 1000.
By doing so, the parameter p can be chosen smaller to achieve the same security.
Note that for large choices of e fewer suitable primes are available, while the
savings obtained, if any, depend strongly on the choice that is made. In particular
the choice p = 2 is an option, which has the property (cf. [24]) that bits of the
XTR-DH exchanged key are as hard as the whole key. However, for such very
small p one should take into account that they make computation of discrete
logarithms easier (cf. [5]), and that 6e ∗ log2(p) should be at least 1740 to get
security equivalent to 1024-bit RSA moduli. As an example, φ6∗299(2) is divisible
by a 91-digit prime.
Because φ6e(X) divides X
2e − Xe + 1, one may replace p by pe in many
expressions above, since conditions that hold modulo p2 − p + 1 still hold if p
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and p2 − p + 1 are replaced by pe and p2e − pe + 1 respectively. The (mostly
straightforward) details of these and other generalizations are left to the reader.
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